

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

*Memo Chicago*

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO		X		
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/LA/DO		X		
18	C/CATF/DO		X		
19	D/ALA/DI		X		
20	NIO/LA		X		
21					
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

3 Mar 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

86- 0697x/1

1 March 1986

Dear Bill,

Thanks for sending me the letter written by Jaime Suchlicki. I share some of his concerns, but believe that with renewed support we will see some improvements down there.

With best regards.

Yours,



William J. Casey

Mr. William R. Kintner  
Department of Political Science  
217 Stiteler Hall/C2  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks

Executive Secretary

20 FEB 86

Date

*UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA*  
PHILADELPHIA 19104

Executive Registry

86-

0697x

DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE C2

February 11, 1986.

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Enclosed please find a letter written to me by my good friend Jaime Suchlicki concerning the quick-sand situation the U.S. faces in Central America. Under our present approach to both Nicaragua and El Salvador we are engaged in a prolonged no-win struggle. There is no chance that harrassment operations against the Sandanistas will topple Ortega's dictatorship. The level and character of American commitment is insufficient to ensure an eventual victory for the pro-democratic forces in the region. We are providing enough aid to keep the various conflicts going but as our intervention progresses without resolution public dissatisfaction will grow.

President Reagan said much the same thing in his televised speech to the nation on May 9, 1984.

As the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by Henry Kissinger, agreed, if we do nothing or if we continue to provide too little help, our choice will be a Communist Central America with additional Communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere, and Communist subversion spreading southward and northward. This Communist subversion poses the threat that 100 million people from Panama to the open border on our south could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes.

If we come to our senses too late, when our vital interests are even more directly threatened, and after a lack of American support causes our friends to lose the ability to defend themselves, then the risks to our security and our way of life will be infinitely greater.

I urge for you to spread Suchlicki's letter throughout the top reaches of the government. The hour is late.

Sincerely,

  
William R. Kintner

WRK:jb

217 Stiteler Hall/C2 • • • (215) 898-7641



January 20, 1986

Dr. William Kintner  
2259 Penypack Lane  
Bryn Athyn, PA 19009

Dear Bill:

As we discussed recently, I am concerned that U.S. policy in Nicaragua is destined to failure. Another U.S. Bay of Pigs in Nicaragua and the establishment of another Cuba will hurt U.S. power posture worldwide. The inability of the U.S. to prevent the establishment of a Soviet military presence in Central America will have an effect on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance and will impact on the respective global prestige and power image of the U.S. and the Soviet Union and influence Moscow's policies and risk calculations in other areas of the world.

I believe that the correct U.S. policy in Nicaragua should aim at preventing a Soviet military presence, ousting the Sandinista leadership and establishing a pro-Western democratic government. U.S. economic sanctions will not oust the Sandinistas or bring them to their knees. The limited aid being provided to the freedom fighters will not do the job either. Increased military aid, support for the anti-Sandinista groups fighting in the South and the development of an urban underground movement—all lacking at present—should be part of our overall strategy. Yet even these actions may not be sufficient.

The Sandinistas have developed a powerful, well equipped army supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union. While disillusionment with the Revolution has increased significantly, this is not likely to develop into massive uprisings against the regime. On the contrary, fleeing Nicaragua seems to be the response to disillusionment and Sandinista terror. The possibility of leaving acts as an escape valve for discontent and prevents an increase of internal tensions. Segments of the freedom fighters also seem to lack the determination and risk taking courage of guerrillas in other countries. There seems to be a willingness to wait it out in the hope of a collapse of the regime, which is not likely to occur, or of a U.S. intervention.

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The options for the U.S. are narrowing. Either we negotiate a truce with the Sandinistas—which will eventually lead to the establishment of a Leninist system and the growth of Soviet military power in Central America—or we make a concerted effort to oust them which will require a U.S. military intervention.

While the latter option has risks and implications it seems the only plausible one. It will prevent Soviet expansion, will weaken the Salvadoran guerrillas, will deny Cuba an important ally and, more significantly, will send out a message about our determination and will to resist Soviet/Cuban advances.

Warmest regards,

*Jaime*  
Jaime Suchlicki  
Director

JS/go